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NOTES.
BANKRUPTCY-CONFLICT OF JURISDICTIONS-What are the
rights of a receiver in bankruptcy with respect to land concerning
which a controversy is then pending in the State court between
the bankrupt and another? This question was presented for decision in a recent case before the Georgia Supreme Court under a
peculiar state of facts.'
Several creditors of an insolvent corporation instituted a proceeding in the State court for the appointment of a receiver to
administer the assets for the benefit of its creditors. In answer
thereto, the corporation filed a cross petition, alleging that one of
the petitioning creditors, in conjunction with others, had fraudulently obtained a deed of conveyance of certain land from it and
praying that the deed be cancelled and the land in controversy
placed in the hands of a receiver. After an ex parte order to that
effect was made and while these proceedings were still pending,
'Harris v. Luxury Fruit Co., 82 S. E. Rep. 447 (Ga. 1914).
(718)

NOTES
the corporation was adjudicated an involuntary bankrupt. The
court of bankruptcy appointed a receiver who applied to the State
court to have all the corporate assets delivered to him; and, in
accordance therewith, the judge of the State court directed the
receiver appointed by him to deliver all assets in his hands, including the disputed land.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, this order was reversed and
the lower court was ordered to retain its jurisdiction over the land
in controversy. Mr. Justice Atkinson, in delivering the opinion of
the court, said, inter alia,2 "Section 7o of the Bankruptcy Act,
by operation of law vests title of the bankrupt in the trustee in
bankruptcy, but does not purport to divest the title or right of
possession of third persons holding adversely to the bankrupt. In
other words, adjudication in bankruptcy will not operate automatically as a judgment in ejectment, ousting adverse claimants
from the possession of land. The federal bankruptcy law supersedes the state insolvency law in regard to the administration of
insolvent estates. See i Remington on Bankruptcy, §i6o2. But
this refers particularly to the estate of the insolvent and has no
application to rights of others holding adversely to the insolvent.
. . . The remedy of the trustee in bankruptcy was, under section ii of the bankruptcy act, to apply to the State court to be
made a party in lieu of the Luxury Fruit Company, to prosecute the
rights asserted in the cross-bill."
The question presented and discussed in this case recalls the
doubt which existed at the, tifine when the Bankruptcy Act of 1867
was in force. It was, at that time, the prevailing opinion that the
moment a man was declared bankrupt, not only was all control
of his assets drawn to the court of bankruptcy by its act of adjudicating him a bankrupt, but all contested .rights could be litigated
with the trustee in no other court and all proceedings then pending in other courts could not be continued unless transferred to the
court of bankruptcy. Accordingly, it became the prevailing practice
to bring all adverse claimants into the bankruptcy court by a rule
to show cause. Against this practice, the Supreme Court of United
States steadily set its face.'
When the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 went into effect, some
referees in bankruptcy and judges, disregarding the experience
under the previous Act, began to follow the practice which had
prevailed until Eyster v. Gaff - had stated the contrary. When
the question arose as to whether, under the present Act, a court of
bankruptcy in which proceedings in bankruptcy were pending has

' At page 449.
'See discussion of this question in Linstroth Wagon Co. v. Ballew, i49
Fed. Rep. 96o (I9o7) ; also see Eyster v. Goff, 91 U. S. 525 (1875).
' 91 U. S.

525

(875).
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jurisdiction to entertain a suit by a trustee in bankruptcy against
a person holding and claiming, as his own, property alleged to have
been conveyed to him by the bankrupt in fraud of creditors, it was
held 5 that, by the provision of Section Twenty-Three b of the Act,
no jurisdiction, except by consent, existed in the bankruptcy court
over adverse claimants and that such suits could only be maintained
in the State courts, or, in case of diversity of citizenship, etc., in the
federal courts. As a result of this decision, the amendatory Act
of i9o3 conferred concurrent jurisdiction of suits by trustees for
such recoveries on the bankruptcy court and State court which
would have had jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened.
In general, it may be said that the courts deal very cautiously
with questions of conflict of jurisdiction between the bankruptcy
and State courts.8 They, however, have certain well defined rules
which are usually followed. *In accordance with the well settled
principle of law that the court which first obtains jurisdiction over
the res retains it to the end, it is generally held that if a State court
obtains possession of property, later claimed by the trustee in bankruptcy, before the petition is filed, it continues to retain jurisdiction
7
over the entire matter, except in three particular instances.
The first exception to this principle is, that where a lien has
been created in the State court by legal proceedings within four
months of the bankruptcy and while the debtor is insolvent, the
State court does not retain its jurisdiction over the property in its
possession." The basis of this exception is -usually stated to be
that "the lien thus created is itself null and void, and being created
by the legal proceedings the legal proceedings themselves are null
and void and fall to the ground." 9 Another exception, where the
State court loses its jurisdiction, occurs when a receiver, assignee
for the benefit of creditors or trustee appointed by the State court
within four months before filing the bankruptcy petition is in possession. 10 In such case also, the custody of the particular official is
superseded by bankruptcy proceedings. The reason for this exception seems to be in doubt. The courts usually place it on the ground
that, as the making of an assignment, etc., is declared to be an act
'Bardes v. First Nat. Bank, 178 U. S.

524 (900).

i Remington on Bankruptcy, §1581.
'Pickens v. Dent, 187 U. S. 177 (i9o2) ; Marble Co. v. Grant, 135 Fed.
Rep. 322 (I9O5); In re Shoemaker, 112 Fed. Rep. 648 (902). The reverse is

also true, that where the bankruptcy court has once assumed jurisdiction
over the property, it has jurisdiction to determine all rights therein. In re
Mertens, 131 Fed. Rep. 507 (i9o4); In re Moody, i34 Fed. Rep. 628 (i9o5).
'i Remington on Bankruptcy, §i599.
'i Remington on Bankruptcy, §i599.
"In re Storck Co., I14 Fed. Rep. 86o (i9o2); It re Knight, 125 Fed.
Rep. 35 (I9O4).
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of bankruptcy, it could not have been intended that the very conveyance which warrants putting the grantor into bankruptcy should
be valid and have the effect of withdrawing all the grantor's property from distribution in bankruptcy." Finally, 'where the property
at the time of the bankruptcy is in the custody of a State court
under State insolvency proceedings, such proceedings are superseded
by the federal bankruptcy proceedings.' 2 The basis of this supersedence lies in the paramount authority conferred by the Constitution on Congress "to establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States." 13
N. I. S. G.

CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW-SEARCHES
AND
SEIZURES-ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED WRONGFULLY-Does that clause

of the Bill of Rights which makes inviolate the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, papers, and effects, of itself render
inadmissible in evidence papers and effects wrongfully obtained from
the house of the defendant? This question was answered in the
affirmative without dissent by the Supreme Court of the United
States, Mr. Justice Day, in Weeks v. United States.'
.This is the first case in which the question has arisen within the
federal jurisdiction and been determined there with regard to the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. But numerous decisions have been given upon the same clause in State constitutions tending with astounding uniformity toward judicial nullification of that constitutional, and supposedly fundamental, guarantee of personal liberty and protection. The fountain-head of this
emasculating doctrine is found in the unwarranted dictum of Mr.
Justice Wilde in Commonwealth v. Dana.2 In that case there was
an indictment for operating a lottery, etc.; a warranthad been issued
upon proper infornmtion, and under it the defendant was taken
and the lottery tickets and materials seized. The court rules, on
page 336: "We are also of opinion that the warrant in this case is
in conformity with all the requisitions of the statute and the declaration of rights. The complaint is.under oath and alleges a probable cause to authorize the search and seizure. The articles are
described, and the place in which they were concealed is -designated
,1Obiter, Randolph v. Scruggs, 190 U. S.533 (1903).
"Corling v. Seyman Co., 113 Fed. Rep. 483 (9o2); In re Curtis, 9i Fed.
Rep. 737 (1899) ; In re Etheridge, 92 Fed. Rep. 329 (899).

"Article I, §8; Constitution of the United States.
134 Supreme Court Rep. 341 (1914).
'2 Metc. 329 (Mass. 1841).

722

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

with sufficient certainty." Then comes the broad dictum at page
337, after the express determination that the warrant was entirely
legal and unimpeachable---"Admitting that the lottery tickets and
materials were illegally seized, 3 still there is no legal objection to
the admission of them in evidence. If the search warrant were
illegal, or if the officer serving the warrant exceeded his authority,
the party on whose complaint the warrant issued, or the officer,
would be responsible for the wrong done; but this is no good reason
for excluding the papers seized as evidence, if they were pertinent
to the issue, as they unquestionably were. When papers are offered
in evidence, the court can take no notice of how they were obtained,
whether lawfully or unlawfully; nor would they form a collateral
issue to determine that question. This point was decided in the
cases of Legatt v. Tollervey4 and Jordan v. Lewis,5 and we are
entirely satisfied that the principle upon which these cases were
decided is sound, and well established." That such an enunciation
upon a fundamental constitutional guarantee is not to be defended
is shown by the facts that (i) it is pure dictum; (2) the two
English cases referred to are based upon an offer in evidence in
an action for malicious prosecution of records of court obtained
without the necessary sanction of the court whence they came, i.e.,
'an independent source-obviously a fundamentally different question than that of papers, etc., obtained wrongfully from the defendant who is now on trial; and (3) such ruling is subversive of an
express constitutional guarantee, the vitalization and enforcement
of which is the avowed and peculiar duty of the court-especially
in cases so inherently involving questions of personal protection and
security, and of public peace and order.
So much for the inception of the doctrine. Its growth and
adoption is even more indefensible in view of the usual thoroughness of research and alertness to preserve constitutional guarantees
displayed by the highest courts of the States where it has found
sanction. But every case appended below 6 has adopted the rule that
such guarantee does not cover the acts of individual officers; that
the State in neither judicial, legislative, nor executive capacity is
Sit may be suggested the surprising and unquestioned acceptance which
Wilde's, J., dictum in the Dana Case has received, is due to the peculiar language there used--"Admitting that the lottery tickets and materials were
illegally seized," as though the court had just determined that they were so
seized, whereas they had just determined the warrant under which they were
taken to be valid. It was a decidedly misleading way to state a position
assumed arguendo and obiter.
'14 East, 302 (Eng. 18I).
'Reported 14 East, 306 n.; decided prior to 176o.
'Com. v. Dana, supra, n. 2; State v. Flynn, 36 N. H. 64 (1858); Gindrat
v. People, 138 Ill. 1O3 (i8gI) ; Shields v. State, io4 Ala. 35 (1893); State v.
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chargeable with the suppression of such wrongfully obtained evidence; and that the injured individual must seek his remedy against
the officer for the trespass-as though there were nothing more
than an incidental civil injury involved. There has been an utter
failure to observe the distinctions between evidence obtained under
exsearch without a warrant and that under warrant; 8 between
9
press warrant to seize the precise papers now offered, and those
taken in excess of, or without warrant; 10 between those taken in
connection with the arrest of the person, either with or without
warrant," and those taken independently, either with or without
warrant.12 Case upon case, they have builded upon the Dana Case,
quoting the dictum set out above as the express decision of the
court therein rendered, and upon the English cases there cited,
each new case being in turn an added "authority" for a case of
later date; and even text writers, citing the Dana Case, have glibly
stated the rule to be as given there, 3 and have in turn themselves
been bases of "authority" for the rule.14 Some day an observing
court will read the Dana Case in its entirety and the house of cards
will fall.
The supreme stultification of the exponents of this doctrine
15
emanates from the Supreme Court of Georgia in Williams v. State:
Atkinson, 40 S. C. 363 (1893) ; -State v. Pomeroy, 130 Mo. 489 (1895) ; Williams v. State, ioo Ga. 511 (i897) ; State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 29W (i86) ;
Adams v. People, 176 N. Y. 351 (i9o3). These cases are the first in their
respective jurisdictions; but in several instances have been followed by later
decisions affirming them. But there is also a current of State decisions
contra, and accord with the federal rule, Iowa v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa, x64
(igo3); Iowa v. Height, 117 Iowa, 65o (ipo2); Hoover v. McChesney, 84
Fed. Rep. 472 (897); and Slamon v. State, 73 Vt. 212 (i9oI), but see State
v. Krinski, 78 Vt. 162 (1905).
IEvidence obtained under warrant, Adams v. People, Com. v. Dana, and
State v. Flynn, supra, note 5.
8Without or in violation of warrant, State v. Griswold, Williams v.
State, Gindrat v. People, State v. Pomeroy, Shields v. State, and State v.
Atkinson, supra, note s.
'Adams v. People, State v. Flynn, supra, note 5.
Williams v. State, State v. Griswold, supra, note 5.
State v. Pomeroy, supra, note 5.
"State v. Griswold, supra, note 5.
" See Greenleaf (Crosswell Ed.) §254a, citing Gindrat v. People, and
Coin. v. Dana; Taylor, Evid. citing the two English cases and Com. v. Dana;
see Wigmore, Evid. §2183, for generous citation of these and subsequent cases.
" Adams v. People, and Shields v. State; State v. Atkinson, citing in turn
Greenl.
"roo Ga. 511 (897), at page 5ig.
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"We are satisfied that the contention of the accused, that her constitutional rights were infringed by the admission of the evidence
complained of, ought not to be sustained [the detective's testimony
that without warrant, before the arrest of the accused, he took from
her apron pocket a purse in which he found coins previously marked
by him and used in the illicit purchase of liquors]. As we understand it, the main, if not the sole, purpose of our constitutional
inhibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures was to place
a salutary restriction upon the powers of government. That is to
say, we believe that the framers of the Constitution of the United
States, and this and other States, merely sought to provide against
any attempt by legislation or otherwise, to authorize, jistif3, or
declare lawful 16 any unreasonable search or seizure. This wise
restriction was intended to operate upon the legislative bodies so as
to render ineffectual any effort to legalize by statute what the people
expressly stipulated could in no event be made lawful; upon executives, so that no law violative of this constitutional inhibition should
ever be enforced; and upon the judiciary so as to render it the duty
of the courts to denounce as unlawful every unreasonable search and
'seizure, whether confessedly without any color of authority, or
sought to be justified under the guise of legislative sanction. For the
misconduct of private persons, acting upon their individual responsibility, and of their own volition, surely none of these three divisions of the government is responsible. If an official or mere petty
agent of the State exceeds or abuses the authority with which he
is clothed, he is deemed to be acting, not for the State, but for himself only; and therefore he alone and not the State should be held
accountable for his acts."
The short result of this decision is that so long as the legislature refrains from enacting a statute, and, consequently, so long
as the executive and the courts have no statute to enforce, there
is nothing for the cohstitutional provision to operate upon. Or again
assuming the legislature to have enacted such a statute, and the
executive to have attempted to utilize it, the constitutional clause
against search and seizure is invoked, the officer justifies under the
statute, the result must be that the statute is a nullity, and furnishes
no protection to the officer, and he is answerable. But meanwhile
what has become of the citizen's right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures; and to prevent evidence thus obtained
from being used against him? It has disappeared absolutely.
However, a more wholesome view of the operations of this guarantee is entertained by the Supreme Court of the United States in
the Weeks Case. 17 The defendant had been taken in custody while
away from his home by a police officer without warrant; while
"Italics are those of the court.
" Supra, note x.

NOTES

other police officers without warrant searched his room, obtained
papers, and later turned them over to the marshal; later the marshal
went to his home, obtained admission and stripped his room of all
papers and effects available, some private, some tending to establish
the fact of lottery operations. Petition was made before trial for
a return of these papers; the private papers returned, but the others
refused. The petition was renewed at opening of trial; was refused
and the papers admitted in evidence over the objection of the
defendant that such admission was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial being had in the District Court, the issue thus
presented itself squarely for determination as a federal question.
While the court is careful to state the question precisely, and observes
that it is not a question of objection, raised for the first time at
trial, of whether evidence obtained under lawful warrant is admissible in evidence (which was the ruling acquiesced in under its ruling in the case of Adams v. New York 18), yet the statements made
in the decision are so emphatic and go so deeply into the fundamentals of constitutional rights, that the case stands squarely against
the ev;sive distinctions and refinements of the State courts. To
quote, "If letters and private documents can thus be seized and
held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense,
the protection of the Fourth Amendment, declaring his right to be
seciire against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so
far as those thus placed are concerned, imight as well be stricken
from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials
to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not
to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established
by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their
embodiment in the fundamental law of the land. The United States
marshal could only have invaded the house of the accused when
armed with a warrant issued as required by the Constitution, upon
sworn information, and describing with reasonable particularity the
thing for which the seirch was to be made. Instead, he acted without sanction of law, . . . and under color of his office under. took to make a seizure of private papers in direct violation of the
constitutional prohibition against such action. Under such circumstances, without a sworn information and particular description,
not even an order of court would have justified such procedure;
much less was it within the authority of the United States marshal
to thus invade the house and privacy of the accused. In Adams v.
New York this court said that the Fourth Amendment was intended
to secure the citizen in person and property against unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his home by officers of the law,

i192 U. S. 585; 48 L. Ed. 575
Court of New York to review the
176 N. Y. 35I (1903).

(904), upon writ of error to the Supreme
decision as reported in Adams v. People,
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acting under legislative or judicial sanction. This protection is
equally extended to the action of the government and the officers
of the law acting under it.1 To sanction such proceedings would be
to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open
defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the
protection of the people against such unauthorized action." 20 And
in an earlier part of the opinion it was said: "This protection reaches
all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving
to it force and effect is obligatory upon all intrusted under our
federal system with the enforcement of the laws. The tendency
of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions,
• . . should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts,
which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution,
and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the
maintenance of such fundamental rights." 21
Clearly such an exposition of the meaning of the clause guaranteeing freedom from unreasonable search and seizure explodes
the fallacious pronouncements of cases like Commonwealth v. Dana
and Williams v. State. Nor can the exponents of that doctrine take
refuge in the distinction that the Weeks Case turned merely upon
the effect of prior petition and refusal to return the papers seized.
The decision is too emphatic and deep for that; and the case was
one of unlawful seizure. Nor will the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the Adams Case avail; for the decision in the
Weeks Case specifically recognizes that they passed on nothing
further in the Adams Case than the admissibility in evidence of
papers taken under a warrant specifically authorizing a search for
gambling paraphernalia, and the papers were a part of such. Further,
a decision that attempted to restrict the effect of the Weeks decision
to mere procedural scope, would in itself admit that a procedural
error committed in the early stages of the trial, even though
attempted to be corrected before final disposition of the cause,
would operate to deprive a man of one of the fundamental constitutional guarantees. Such a view finds no encouragement in the
Weeks Case, and is in decided contrast with the zeal displayed by
the courts universally in vitalizing and enforcing the other constitutional clause affording protection to the individual, e. g., "self
"Boyd v. U. S., ii6 U. S. 616; 29 L. Ed. 746 (i886), affirmed and relied
on in Weeks Case. See Wigmore's adverse criticism of the Boyd Case, §2264.
"Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S.727 (1877) ; Boyd v. U. S., supra, note i8;
Brain v. U. S., I68 U. S.532 (897).
Cases, supra, note I9,and the famous English case of Entick v. Carrington, ig How. St. Tr. 1030 (765), in which Lord Camden laid down the
common law, and prerogative rights in regard to the issuance, execution and
protection from search warrants, except they be in conformity to the Bill of
Rights. Cooley, Constl. Limitations, 364-373.

NOTES

incrimination," "twice in jeopardy," "due process," or "trial by jury."
It is difficult to see how these are in their nature any inore fundamentally inherent constitutional guarantees which of themselves
enjoin their observance on the courts than is that of unreasonable
searches and seizures, which several State courts have relegated to
a question of "collateral issue," merely.
J.C.A.
INTERSTATE COMMERcE-CARmARK AMENDMENT-LIABILITY

DELAY-A carload of strawberries was delivered by a shipper
(the plaintiff and appellee) to a railroad company (defendant and
appellant) for transportation from Marion, Md., to New York City
over the lines of the defendant and connecting carriers. The declaration alleged that .the defendant, or companies operating connecting
lines, failed to forward the shipment with reasonable dispatch; that
because of this delay the berries did not reach their destination until
after the close of the market for which they were intended, and
for which they would have arrived in time if due diligence had
been observed in their transportation; and that they consequently
sustained a loss in value. The evidence showed that the berries
were shipped on the afternoon of Thursday, May 26, and, according to the usual operation of trains engaged in this class of service,
they should have been delivered in New York City the following
night, in advance of the early Saturday morning wholesale market,
which opened about i o'clock A. M. The shipment reached its
destination in good condition, but about six hours later than the
customary time of arrival. The wholesale market, for which the
berries were shipped, and in which they could have been sold to
advantage, was then practically at an end, and the price had fallen
two or three cents per quart below that which might have been
received if they had beqn forwarded with the usual dispatch. The
berries had to be sold at these lower prices because of the delay in
their delivery. The defendant was sued as the initial carrier under
the Carmark Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act 1 and a
verdict of two cents per quart was obtained, which was sustained
FOR

'Act of Feb. 4, 1887, c. 1o4, §2o, 24 Stat 386, U. S. Comp. St. igoi, p.
3169, as amended by Act of June 29, i9o6, c. 3591, §7, 34 Stat. 593, U. S.
Comp. St. Supp. I9H, p. 1307, which provides in part:
"That any common carrier, railroad or transportation company receiving

property for transportation from a point in one State to a point in another
State, shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor and shall be liable to
the lawful holder therefor for any loss, damage, or injury to such property

caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad or transportation company
to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such
property may pass, and no contract, receipt, rule or regulation shall exempt
such common carrier, railroad or transportation company from the liability
hereby imposed."
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on appeal. The court held that the loss of value resulting from the
delay in transit was within the purview of the provisions making
the initial carrier liable "for any loss, damage, or injury to such
property." 2
So far as has been able to be discovered, this is the first case,
either in a State court or in a federal court in which the single
question as to whether "delay" is covered by the words "loss, damage, or injury to such property," has been thoroughly considered
and decided. In Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Nelson 3 the court said
obiter: "The federal statute, commonly known as the "Carmark
Amendment," making the initial carrier liable in interstate shipments, does not, in our opinion, apply where the damage claimed
is not in reference to the property itself, which is the subject of
the transportation. Here the property was not damaged in any
manner. The principles of law which govern this case are those
general principles which enter in the common law of carriers." In disposing of that case the Maryland court in the
principal case said: "As the property shipped in that case was not
affected in its condition or value, it was held that the suit was properly based on the common law right of recovery rather than upon
the federal statute. This decision is not at all at variance with our
conclusion of the present case." As to whether this is a distinction
without a difference, is left to the reader to judge from the facts of
the two cases. In the Texas case 4 the consequential damages consisted in additional expense and loss of profits caused by the late
arrival of shipments of lumber which delayed the completion of
structural work. The lumber, which was the property transported,
was used, but because of the delay in its arrival, the machinery and
men were compelled to be idle, thus causing additional expense.
In the Maryland case 5 the consequential damages consisted in the
loss of profits caused by the late arrival of the berries which resulted
from the.disposal of the berries at a less advantageous price than
would have been possible if there had been no delay. The berries,
however, had not been affected in their "condition"; they had not
deteriorated so far as quality was concerned, but were, on the other
hand, sold as good berries, a lower price, however, being received
for them because the market was almost over.
In the principal case8 it was argued on behalf of the defendant
that the only cases for which the statute provides are those in which
* N. Y. P. & N. R. Co. v. Peninsula Produce Exchange of Maryland, 89
Atl. Rep. 433 (Md. 1914). We are, however, advised, that this case has been
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
a 139 S. W. Rep. 81 (Tex. 1911).
'Supra, note 3.
'Supra, note 2.
Supra, note 2.
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the commodities themselves become damaged or depleted in the
course of the transportation, and that an impairment of value due
to delay in delivery, while it occasions a loss to the owner, does not
produce any "loss, damage, or injury to the property," and, hence,
this cause of action cannot be pursued under the statute.
In Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills,7 the court said: "The

indisputable affect of the Carmark amendment is to hold the initial
carrier engaged in interstate commerce and receiving property for
transportation from a point in one State to a point in another State,
as having contracted for through carriage to the point of destination, using the lines of connecting carriers as its agents." The court
then went on to set forth8 the doctrine generally accepted in
America, 9 in the absence of legislation, that a carrier unless there be
a special contract, is only bound to carry over its own line and then
deliver to a connecting carrier; and the English doctrine, 0 followed
in some American jurisdictions,"' that the mere receipt of property
for transportation to a point beyond the line of the receiving carrier, without any qualifying agreement, justified an inference of ah
agreement for through transportation- and an assumption of full
carrier liability by the initial carrier.
The court then said :12 "In this conflicting conditi6n of the
decisions as to the circumstances from which an agreement for
through transportation of property design.ted to a point beyond
the receiving carrier's line might be inferred, Congress by the act '2
here involved has declared; in substance, that the act of receiving
property for transportation to a point in another State and beyond
the line of the receiving carrier shall impose on such receiving carrier the obligation of through transportation with carrier liability
throughout."
"This burdensome situation of the shipping public in reference
to interstate shipments over routes including separate lines of carS. 186 (igo).
'Supra, note 7, pages 196, 197.
T219 U.

'R. R. v. Manufacturing Co., 16 Wall. 83 U. S. 324 (1872); R. R. v.
Pratt, 22 Wall. 89 U. S. 123 (1874) ; R. R. v. McCarthy, 96 U. S. 258 (1877) ;
Myrick v. M. C. R. R., 107 U. S. 102 (1882); Burroughs v. N. & W. R. R.,
Ioo Mass. 26 (868).
IX
"'Muschamp v. Lancaster Ry. Co., 8 M. & W. 421 (Eng. 1841) ; Bristol,
etc., Ry. v. Collins, 7 H. L. Cases, 194 (Eng. x859).
GR. R. v. Mt. Vernon Co., 84 Ala. 175 (1887); R. R. v. Hasselkus, 91
Ga. 384 (1893) ; Beard v. R. R., 79 Iowa, 531 (189o) ; R. R. v. Wilcox, 84 Ill.
24o (1876) ; Kyle v. R. R., IO Rich. 382 (S. C. 1857) ; R. R. v. Rogers &
Hartsell, 6 Heisk. x43 (Tenn. 1871) ; R. R. v. Campbell, 7 Heisk. 257 (Tenn.
1872).
" Supra, note 7, at page 198.
"Supra, note I.
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riers was the matter which Congress undertook to regulate. Thus
when this Carmark Amendment was reported by a conference committee, Judge William Richardson, a Congressman from Alabama,
speaking for the committee of the matter which it was sought to
remedy, among other things, said: 'One of the great complaints of
the railroads has been-and, I think, a reasonable, just and fair
complaint-that when a man made a shipment, say, from Washington, for instance, to San Francisco, and his shipment was lost in
some way, the citizen had to go thousands of miles, probably, to
institute suit. The result was that he had to settle his damages
at what he could get. What have we done? We have made the
initial carrier, the carrier that takes and receives the shipment,
responsible for the loss of the article in the way of damages. We
save the shipper from going to California or some distant place to
institute his suit. Why? The reasons for inducing us to do that
were that the initial carrier has a through route connection with
the secondary carrier, on whose route the loss occurred, and a settlement between them will be an easy matter, while the shipper
would be at heavy expense in the institution of a suit.'"14
The court continued :15 "That a situation had come about which
demanded regulation in the public interest was the judgment of
Congress. The requirement that carriers who undertook to engage
in interstate transportation, and as a part of that business held themselves out as receiving packages destined to places beyond their own
terminal, should be required as a condition of continuing in that
traffic to obligate themselves to carry to the point of destination,
using the lines of connecting carriers as their own agencies, was
not beyond the scope of the power of regulation. The rule is
adapted to secure the rights of the shipper by securing unity of
transportation with unity of responsibility. The regulation is one
which also facilitates the remedy of one who sustains a loss, by
localizing the responsible carrier..
"Reduced to the final results, the Congress has said that a
receiving carrier, in spite of any stipulation to the contrary, shall
be deemed, when it receives property in one State to be transported
to a point in another involving the use of a connecting carrier for
some part of the way, to have adopted such other carrier as its
agent, and to incur carrier liability throughout the entire route.
"In substance Congress has said to such carriers, 'If you receive
articles for transportation from a poi'ht in one State to a place
in another, beyond your own terminal, you must do so under a
contract to transport to the place designated. If you are obliged
to use the services of independent carriers in the continuance of the
'Cong. Record, Pt. io, page 958o.
' Supra, note 7, at page 203, et seq.
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transit, you must use them as your own agents and not as agents of
the shipper.'"
In Adams Ex. Co. v. Croninger,16 the Supreme Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Lurton, said: "Prior to that amendment (the
Carmark Amendment) the rule of carrier's liability, for an interstate shipment of property, as enforced in both federal and State
courts, was either that of the general common law as declared by
this court and enforced in the federal courts throughout the United
States; 17 or that determined by the supposed public policy of a
particular State; I' or that prescribed by statute law of a particular
State. 9 . . . That the legislation supersedes all the regulations
and policies of a particular State upon the same subject results from
its general character. It embraces the subject of the liability of the
carrier under a bill of lading which he must issue and limits his
power to exempt himself by rule, regulation, or contract .
..
The duty to issue a bill of lading and the liability thereby assumed
are covered in full, and though there is no reference to the effect
upon State regulation, it is evident Congress intended to adopt a
uniform rule and relieve such contracts from the diverse regulation
to which they had been theretofore subject. . . . The liability
thus imposed is limited to 'any loss, injury, or damage caused by it
or a succeeding carrier to whom the property may be delivered,'
and plainly implies a liability for some default in its common law
duty ds a comnwn carrier."
In the principal case 20 the Maryland court said, "The reason
and policy of the act are sufficiently broad to include the liability
here sought to be charged. The remedies of the shippers in respect
to losses of value from delay of transportation were subject to the
same diversities and inconveniences as were those relating to recovery for physical injury to the property accepted for carriage. In
each class of cases there was an apparent and iqual need of uniformity and simplicity in the regulation and enforcement of the
carrier's liability."
From the language dnd decisions in the Croninger and Riverside Mills Cases we are practically compelled to agree with the Maryland court as to the "reason and policy of the act" as well as to
the "equal need of uniformity and simplicity," but it is submitted
that "reason and policy" and even "equal need" do not necessarily
determine the intent of Congress. But even granting that it was the
legislative intent to include, within the scope of the act, conse1"226 U. S. 491, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148, 57 L. Ed. 314 (1912).
" t Hart v. Pennsylvania R. R., 112 U. S. 331 (884).
Pennsylvania R. R. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477 (1903).
Chicago, etc., R. R. v. Sloan, 169 U. S. 133 (1897).

Supra, note 2.
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quential damages to the owner due to delay, it is submitted that
there must be some words in the act which lend themselves to
such construction; some words at least approximately appropriate
for the expression of such intent; the words used must be sufficiently ambiguous to allow some reasonable difference of opinion
as to their interpretation. It is rather difficult to conceive how the
words "damage to property" dan mean damage to the ozwner where
the actual property itself has suffered no loss of quantity or quality.
Though there be "equal need" of uniformity of regulation, yet if
Congress has legislated as to "loss or damage," but failed to legislate as to "delay," the act does not cover both class of cases. If
the result reached by the Maryland court is correct, it is at least
rather a forced construction of the words of the act. As has been
noted, however, the case has been appealed to the Supreme Court
of the United States and we can do no more than await the decision
of that tribunal, remembering that, as we have seen from the Riverside Mills Case, that the court has already expressed itself rather
strongly in favor of the view'that the act imposes full carrier liability, throughout the entire route, upon the initial carrier.
In the Croninger Case 21 it was said that: "The constitutional
power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States and with
foreign nations comprehends power to regulate contracts between
the shipper and the carrier of an interstate shipment by defining the
liability of the carrier for loss, delay, injury, or damage to such
property." It might be argued that the use of the word "delay" in
the sentence just quoted indicates that the Supreme Court regarded
that cause of loss as a separate and distinct ground of liability,
and that, as it is not specifically mentioned in the Carmark Amendment, it should be held to be excluded from the remedy therein
provided.
C. McA. S.

LIBEL-EQUITY JURISDICTION-Upon the question of preventive
relief in equity by injunction against the publication of libellous
statements, affecting the character or business of a person, there
seems to be a misunderstanding of the true state of the law on the
part of text-book writers and a few State courts. The Circuit Court
of Appeals of the Second Circuit, in a recent case,' has, in a very
lucid opinion, cleared up the mist, and pointed out distinctly the
settled rules upon the subject.
In respect to the remedy by injunction, a libel occupies much
the same position as a crime. As was said by Lord Eldon: 2 "The
2126

U. S. 491 (1912), at page 5o0.

'American Malting Co. v. Keitel, 2o9 Fed. Rep. 351 (913).
'Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 413 (Eng. 18i8).
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publication of a libel is a crime; and the court of chancery has no
jurisdiction to interfere by injunction to prevent the commission of
crimes." The early English decisions are uniformly to the effect
that where the injury complained of is that of defamation of character only, there is no rule of equity conferring jurisdiction to
restrain it by injunction3 Equity will, however, as a rule, act to
protect property rights; and in several applications for injunction
to restrain libellous publications, it was urged that they would
injure Property, 'iz., the good will and business of the complainant.
But the court I answered that contention by stating: "With regard
to nine out of ten libels, the same thing might be said. The cases
in which actions are brought for libel are usually cases where things
are written of men or corporations which have an effect upon
their character and upon their trade or business; but no case can
be produced in which, in these circumstances, the court of chancery
has interfered." So that, the almost unbroken line of English
decisions affirms the doctrine that the preventive jurisdiction of
equity being limited to the protection of property rights which are
remediless by the usual course of procedure at law, courts of equity
will not restrain the publication of libels though such publications
are calculated to injure the credit, busiiess or character of the person aggrieved, and that the complainant will be left to pursue his
remedy at law; it being considered that in cases of libel and slander
there is a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law.
There are two English decisions ' in -which Vice-Chancellor
Malins granted injunctions against libels. But these decisions were
flatly in the teeth of the settled rule, and followed the fate of most
of that learned Vice-Chancellor's opinions: they were overruled in
1875 by a court consisting of Lord Cairns, Lord Justice James,
and Lord Justice Mellish, probably as strong a Court of Appeal in
Chancery as ever sat, where it was ruled as well-settled that the
court of chancery has no jurisdiction to restrain the publication of
a libel.' This rule, however, has been changed by statute in England.
The Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 conferred on the English
courts of common law the power to grant injunctions in all personal
actions of contract or tort, with no limitation as to defamation. And
by the Judicature Act of 1873, a power was conferred upon the
Chancery division of the High Court to grant injunctions in cases
of libel. But the English courts still interfere only in the clearest
cases.

'Clark v. Freeman, ii Beav.

112

(Eng. 1848) ; Mulkern v. Ward, L. R.

13 Eq. 61g (Eng. 1872); Hammersmith Co. v. Dublin Co.,
(Eng. i87o).

L. R. io Eq. 235

'Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott, L. R. io Ch. App. 142 (Eng. 1875).
'Springfield Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551 (Eng. 1868); Dixon v. Holden,
L. R. 13 Eq. 355 (Eng. 1872).
'Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott, L. R. io Ch. App. 142 (Eng. 1875).
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The undoubted weight of American authority is in accord with
the English doctrine prior to the statutes aforementioned." Our
courts adopted the rule as one firmly established in equity jurisprudence. And several courts have laid stress on the fact that a
contrary holding would abridge freedom of speech and the liberty
of the press. There are cases, however, where courts have issued
injunctions to restrain the publication of false statements injurious
to business or property; but those were cases which involved conspiracy, intimidation or coercion." For example, an injunction was
issued to restrain one from issuing circulars threatening to bring suits
for infringements against all customers dealing in a competitor's
patented article, thus attempting to intimidate complainant's customers by threatening them with suits which the defendants never
intended to prosecute.
In view of the extent to which libellous publications are being
used today by unscrupulous men to further their private interests
by defaming the good name and reputation of their competitors,
and in view of the pernicious and detrimental effect of this upon
business, the greater protection afforded by the English courts under
the present statutes seems to be demanded by a just regard for
the vastness and variety of our commercial interests. In practice, the liability to criminal prosecution or to a civil action for
damages has not proved effectual. Our jurisprudence must in some
way meet that demand. An immediate change by the courts themselves would be a palpable violation of judicial functions. It is,
then, for the legislators to realize that our commercial interests
require a prevention of the wrong, rather than punishment or satisfaction for it after it is committed.
Y.L.S.
WITNESSES-SELF-INCRIMINATION-IMM UNITY-The Court of

Criminal Appeals of Texas recently held I that under the codes as
construed by the decisions, where the district attorney tenders immu'Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass. 69 (1873); Sherry
v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212 (I888); Marlin Co. v. Shields, 17 N. Y. 384 (1902) ;
Balto. Life Ins. Co. v. Geisner, 202 Pa. 386 (19o2); Mayer v. Journeyman
Assn., 47 N. J. Eq. 519 (189o); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Domestic Co., 49 Ga. 70
(1873); Kidd v. Hoery, 28 Fed. Rep. 774 (1886); Co. v. Union, 5, Fed. Rep.
26o (i891); Edison v. Co., 128 Fed. Rep. 957 (9o4); Mtg. Assn. v. Co., i5o
Fed. Rep. 413 (1907); Citizens Co. v. Mtg. Co., 171 Fed. Rep. 553 (1909);
College v. Co., 197 Fed. Rep. 982 (1912); Francis v. Flynn, 118 U. S. 385

(1885).

'Beck v. Ry. Union, x18 Mich. 497 (1898); Einack v. Kane, 34 Fed. Rep.
46 (1888); Casey v. Union, 45 Fed. Rep. r35 (I89i); Adriance Co. v. Nat'l
Co., 121 Fed. Rep. 827 (19O3).
'Ex parte Muncy, 163 S. W. Rep. 29 (Tex. 1914).
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nity from punishment and such offer receives the sanction and
approval of the district judge, this furnishes absolute and complete
immunity from punishment for offenses about which he might be
questioned and called to testify, and the witness cannot claim the
privilege from self-incrimination and could be imprisoned for his
refusal to testify.
One of the most cherished sanctions of our common law is
that a witness will not be compelled to answer any question the
reply to which would supply evidence by which he could be convicted of a criminal offense.2 Such privilege, moreover, has been
almost universally secured by constitutional provision. Stringent
as the general rule is, certain classes of cases have always been
treated as not falling within the reasons of the rule, and, therefore, constituting apparent exceptions. When examined these cases
will all be found to be based upon the idea that, if the testimony
sought cannot possibly be used as a basis for, or in aid of, a criminal prosecution against the witness, the rule ceases to apply, its
object being to protect the witness himself and no one else. Legal
criminality consists in liability to the law's punishment. When that
liability is removed, criminality ceases, and with that criminality
the privilege. An acquittal conclusively negatives criminality and in
such case the rule does not apply.8 The same is true of a crime
erased by lapse of time. Such is in effect an expurgation of the
crime, 4and after the lapse of the time fixed by the law the privilege
ceases.
Statutes of indemnity and'special amnesty have the same effect,
when they do not conflict 'with local constitutions.5 The law, how-

ever, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for
the offense to which the question relates.' If the object of the provision be to secure the witness against a criminal prosecution, which
might be aided directly or indirectly by his disclosure, then, if no
such prosecution be possible,-in other words, if his testimony operates as a complete pardon for the offense to which it relates,-a
statute absolutely securing him such immunity would satisfy the constitutional guaranty against being compelled, in any criminal case,

'Whart. Cr. Ev. (8th Ed.), §463; Greenleaf Ev. (r5th Ed.), Vol. 1, §451..
'Floyd v. State, 7 Tex. 215 (i85i).
'Malanke v. Cleland, 76 Ia. 4oi (i888); Lamson v. Boyden, i6o Ill. 613

(i896).
'Whart. Cr. Ev. (8th Ed.), §47r.
'Counselman v. Hitchcock, r42 U. S. 54 (x892); Cullen v. Comm., 24
Grat. 624 (Va. 1873),--"that nothing short of complete amnesty to the witness, and absolute wiping out of the offense as to him, so that he could no
longer be prosecuted for it, would furnish indemnity."-Quoted with approval
in Ex parte Carter, i66 Mo. 6o4 (igo0).

736

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

to be a witness against himself.7 It may be said that statutory immunity virtually repeals the law creating the crime under the particular
state of facts, or to put it in technical form, the law defining the
offense is restricted in its application so as to prevent there being
an offense under a given state of facts in which the immunity is
declared to exist. Criminality is the creation of the law, not an
inherent element in the act itself. It may therefore be taken away
by the law. Many such statutes annulling the privilege against selfincrimination have been passed. 8 They have been the expedients
resorted to for the investigation of offenses whose proof and punishment were otherwise practically impossible because of the criminal
implication to the offense itself of all who could bear useful testimony. Any evidence that a witness may give under a statutory
direction will not be "against himself" for the reason that by the
very act of giving evidence he becomes exempted from any prosecution or punishment for the offense respecting which his evidence
is given.9
The majority of the court in the present case maintain that the
constitutional inhibition has no application any more than in the
above cases for the witness is protected against the evidence he may
give being used against him, and this is what the constitution guarantees him-nothing more and nothing less. But is this true, is
he protected? Davidson, J., in a vigorous dissent, says that after a
most painstaking investigation he had found that the power to
thrust immunity upon a witness against his consent, and compel
his testimony where such testimony implicates him in a crime, had
never been lodged or vested in the judicial department of the government. As brought out by counsel in their argument and the dissenting opinion the cases cited by the majority as supporting the
view that the courts have this right will be found to be cases where
the witness agreed to testify. Indeed it may be said that no case
holding assent not necessary can be found. The majority say that
it would be absurd to require the district judge and attorney when
they desire to use a witness to beg him to enter into agreement
with the State, that it would be lowering the dignity of the courts
to require such a thing. Such can hardly be said to be the case
where a constitutional privilege is at stake. Such immunity as tendered here does not seem to be complete because the whole matter
was conditional upon his testifying ind carrying out the agreement. This is what differentiates it from the statutory immunity,
which is complete whenever he is used as a witness and compelled to
testify. Moreover the immunity granted to obtain the testimony is
in the nature of a pardon or amnesty, and no pardon or amnesty
'Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896), Brown, J.
'Wigmore, Ev. (905), Vol. IV, p. 3167.
'Ex parte Cohen, 104"Cal. 524 (,894).
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can be effective until voluntarily accepted by the person pardoned.10
This is another reason in support of the proposition that the court
cannot, at request of state's attorney or otherwise, compel the
accused to testify against his will.
It has been said that the constitutional guaranty protects a
witness from all compulsory testimony which would expose him
to infamy and disgrace, though the facts disclosed might not lead
to a criminal prosecution."1 This doctrine rests on a misconception
so radical, 12 that it has been repeatedly repudiated by the courts.
The law still remains unsettled on this question but the great weight
of authority 31 is that he may be compelled to answer, if the answer
can have no effect upon the case, except so far as to impair the
credibility of the witness, he may fall back upon his privilege.
But even in the latter case, if the answer of the witness will not
directly show his infamy, but only tend to disgrace him, he is bound
to answer. "- In questions involving a criminal offense, the rule, as
we have seen, is different, the witness being permitted to judge for
the most part for himself, and to refuse to answer wherever it
would tend to subject him to a criminal punishment.' 5
The-privilege is a personal one, which the witness may waive.1"
He is said to waive it when he testifies without objection.' 7 By testifying as to part, he waives the protection and can be compelled to
testify as to the whole.'
In order to be available, it must be
claimed by the witness, 9 and if he does not, no one-else can claim
it for him, nor can he use it for the protection of another.20 The
proper time to raise the objection is upon the asking of the question
which the witness fears he may incriminate himself by answering,
at whatever stage of the proceeding such question is asked.2' He
cannot avail himself of the privilege by stating he throws himself
"Comm. v. Halloway, 44 Pa. 210 (1863); Rosson v. State, 23 Tex. App.
287 (1887); U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150 (U. S. 1833)..
Field, J., dissenting, Brown v. Walker, supra, note 7.
'Wigmore Ev. (19o), Vol. IV, p. 31o8.
"1 Greenl. Ev. (5th Ed.), §§454, 455; People v. Mather, 4 Wend.
229
(N. Y. i83o); Weldon v. Burch, 12 Ill. 374 (18i); Ex parte Rowe, 7 Cal.
,84 (,857).
"I Greenl. Ev. (iSth Ed.), §456.
'French v. Venneman, 14 Ind. 282 (i86o); Simons v. Holster, 13 Minn.
249 (z868).
"East India Co. v. Atkins, I Stra. 168 (Eng. i7i9); Fries v. Brugles,
12 N. J.L. 79 (i83o); Comm. v. Nicholls, 114 Mass. 285 (1873).
I'People v. Willard, i5o Cal. 543 (i9o7).
'People v. Freshour, 55 Cal. 375 (i88o) ; Comm. v. Pratt, 126 Mass. 462
(1879).
'State v. Ekanger, 8 N. D. 559 (899).
In re Moser, 138 Mich. 3o2 (19o4).
"Amherst v. Hollis, 9 N. H. 1O7 (I837) ; Pitcher v. People, i6 Mich. 142
(2867) ; Eckstein's Petition, 148 Pa. 5o9 (2892).
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on his privilege, but he must make oath that in his opinion the
effect of his answer would tend to incriminate him.2 2 The witness,
himself, is not the sole judge of whether an answer to a question
will tend to incriminate him so as to entitle him to refuse to
answer; 2a but it is for the court before which the question is raised
to decide whether a witness must answer.14 And, in order to entitle
the witness to the privilege of silence, the court must see from the
circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence called for
danger to the witness
that there is reasonable ground to apprehend
25
from his being compelled to answer.
S.L.M.
'Penna. Bldg., etc., Assoc. v. Mayer, 2 Mont. Co. Rep. 41 (Pa. I886);
People v. Seaman, 8 Misc. Rep. 152 (N. Y. 2894).
I State v. Duffy, 15 Ia. 425 (1863).
"Comm. v. Bell, 145 Pa. 374 (i89i) ; U. S. v. Burr, Fed. Cas. No. 14,.

692e (i8o7).

'Manning

v. Mercantile Securities Co., 242 Ill. 584 (i9o9); State v.

Murray, 82 Ohio, 305 (191o).

